| Nobuaki Hori | Last modified date：2023.11.22 |
Associate Professor /
Policy Analysis /
Department of Economic Engineering /
Faculty of Economics
Presentations
| 1. | Political Economy of Moral, Religion, and Liberalism. |
| 2. | A Model of Misallocation of Talent with Self-Fulfilling Expectations. |
| 3. | Political Agency Model. |
| 4. | Nobuaki Hori, Seng Peseth, Institution, Foreign Investment and Resource Curse, APUGSM Conference 2014 Summer, 2014.07, Most countries with natural resource abundance tend to have lower welfare. Resource curse literature has argued that the resource boom attracts more entrepreneurs from the productive sector of an economy into rent seeking activity and thus lower the country’s income. In this paper, we incorporate foreign investment into resource curse literature and develop a new model to examine the welfare effect of the composition of foreign investment. In our model, there are two types of foreign investors: natural resource and manufacturing investors. Foreign investment inflows require partnership with local entrepreneurs who may choose to become rent seekers or producers. We show that corrupted institution or foreign investment policies that encourage rent seeking activities and higher share of resource investment relative to manufacturing investment could result in lower income of an economy; and, in the worst case, may lead an economy to get stuck in rent seeking trap. The smaller economy with higher potential resources for extraction are more vulnerable to such negative impacts. We also claim that the country who tries to improve its institutional quality to attract manufacturing investment may experience period of lower income. During the process of institutional reforms, when institutional quality is not good enough to attract sufficient manufacturing investment to move an economy out of the rent seeking trap, the country might experience an even lower income than in the pre-reform period. However, it is worthwhile for a country to continue improving its institutional quality to get out of the rent seeking trap and to enjoy a faster and more sustainable development. . |
| 5. | Nobuaki Hori, Xiaoyi Luo, A Collective Failure: Issue Bias in Newspaper Coverage, 18th International Conference on Cultural Economics, 2014.06. |
| 6. | Nobuaki Hori, Xiaoyi Luo, Does Globalization Really Extinguish Minor Cultures?: An Endogenous Innovation Model, 2014年度日本応用経済学会春季大会, 2014.06. |
| 7. | Nobuaki Hori, Seng Peseth, Institution, Foreign Investment and Resource Curse, 2014年度日本応用経済学会春季大会, 2014.06, Most countries with natural resource abundance tend to have lower welfare. Resource curse literature has argued that the resource boom attracts more entrepreneurs from the productive sector of an economy into rent seeking activity and thus lower the country’s income. In this paper, we incorporate foreign investment into resource curse literature and develop a new model to examine the welfare effect of the composition of foreign investment. In our model, there are two types of foreign investors: natural resource and manufacturing investors. Foreign investment inflows require partnership with local entrepreneurs who may choose to become rent seekers or producers. We show that corrupted institution or foreign investment policies that encourage rent seeking activities and higher share of resource investment relative to manufacturing investment could result in lower income of an economy; and, in the worst case, may lead an economy to get stuck in rent seeking trap. The smaller economy with higher potential resources for extraction are more vulnerable to such negative impacts. We also claim that the country who tries to improve its institutional quality to attract manufacturing investment may experience period of lower income. During the process of institutional reforms, when institutional quality is not good enough to attract sufficient manufacturing investment to move an economy out of the rent seeking trap, the country might experience an even lower income than in the pre-reform period. However, it is worthwhile for a country to continue improving its institutional quality to get out of the rent seeking trap and to enjoy a faster and more sustainable development. . |
| 8. | International Trade and Dynamic Cultural Diversity Based on Endogenous Innovation Model. |
| 9. | Dynamics of Promotion Policies: A Model of Organizational Inertia. |
| 10. | Dynamics of Promotion Policies: A Model of Organizational Inertia. |
| 11. | Excessive Competition and the Mobility of Labor Market. |
| 12. | Excessive Competition and the Mobility of Labor Market . |
| 13. | Excessive Competition and the Mobility of Labor Market. |
| 14. | Promotion Policies and Distance to Frontier. |
| 15. | Promotion Policies and Distance to Frontier. |
| 16. | Promotion Policies and Distance to Frontier, [URL]. |
| 17. | Promotion Policies and Distance to Frontier. |
| 18. | Promotion Policies and Distance to Frontier. |
| 19. | Different Corporate Governance Regimes and the Welfare Consequence of International Competition. |
| 20. | Different Corporate Governance Regimes and the Welfare Consequence of International Competition. |
| 21. | The Rank Order of Universities and Educational Investment . |
| 22. | Matching as signal. |
| 23. | Matching as Signal . |
| 24. | Matching as Signal. |
| 25. | Business Life Cycle and Labor Market. |
| 26. | Market Vursus Within-firm Adjustment and Labor Market. |
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