Kyushu University Academic Staff Educational and Research Activities Database
List of Papers
Konari Uchida Last modified date:2019.05.24

Professor / Fields in Economic Analysis and Policy / Department of Economic Engineering / Faculty of Economics

1. Hocheol Nam, Konari Uchida, Accounts payable and firm value: International evidence, Journal of Banking and Finance,, 102, 116-137, 2019.04, [URL].
2. Pengda Fan, Konari Uchida, Credit crunch and timing of initial public offerings, Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 10.1016/j.pacfin.2018.09.003, 53, 22-39, 2019.02, We find that firms with more outstanding short-term debt are more likely to go public in bear markets than firms with less short-term debt. Importantly, this finding is evident for firms going public after a reduction of total bank credits in the loan market. Bear market IPOs repay more short-term debt during the IPO year than other IPOs do, and have lower offering prices and proceeds. These results suggest a credit crunch significantly affects the timing and costs of IPOs when firms owe significant short-term debt..
3. Elizabeth Marie Motta,Konari Uchida, Institutional investors, corporate social responsibility, and stock price performance, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 10.1016/j.jjie.2017.12.002, 47, 91-102, 2018.03, [URL], In 2006, the United Nations Global Compact launched Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), and the Japanese Ministry of Environment advocated financial mechanisms for environmental protection. We find that institutional ownership in 2005 is positively related to the probability of subsequent improvements in environment ratings for Japanese firms. The result is especially evident for domestic institutional shareholders who signed up for the PRI. These results suggest that soft laws aimed at institutional investors can enhance responsible business practices and that national government initiatives play an effective role. Finally, improved ratings in the environment category do not harm shareholder wealth..
4. Liping Dong,Konari Uchida,Xiaohong Hou, Are future capital gain opportunities important in the market for corporate control? Evidence from China, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.10.006, 2017.12, [URL], Stock prices of Chinese target companies react positively to the announcement of block trades. Such a reaction is greater when publicly tradable shares (PTS) are transferred than when bidders obtain nonpublicly tradable shares (NPTS). PTS transactions also perform significantly better in the long run than do NPTS transactions. These results suggest that stock liquidity matters for corporate control rights transactions to improve target firms' management. We also find that bidders appoint a new CEO or chief director in more than half of the cases of block trades. Better stock price performance for PTS transactions comes mainly from targets with high Tobin's Q. Capital gain opportunities are likely to motivate bidders to expand target firms' businesses for capital gains..
5. Yue Sun, Konari Uchida, The Role of Bank-Affiliated Venture Capital for Parent Banks in Japan: New Evidence, Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 10.1111/ajfs.12155, 45, 6, 864-885, 2016.12, [URL].
6. Shinya Shinozaki, Hiroshi Moriyasu, Konari Uchida, Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 10.1017/S0022109016000636, 51, 5, 1719-1738, 2016.10, Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan..
7. Yong Huang, Konari Uchida, Daolin Zha, Market timing of seasoned equity offerings with long regulative process, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.05.001, 39, 278-294, 2016.08, [URL], A long regulative process exists between the initial announcement and execution of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in China. Although the initial announcement of an SEO is associated with a significant reduction in the stock price, the regulator (China Securities Regulatory Commission) finally approves it after a significant run up in the price of the stock. Chinese managers execute SEOs after additional stock price increases. As a result, the stock price at issuance is not significantly different from the price on announcement, and is significantly higher than the price three months before the announcement. We also find stock prices decline following the execution. These results suggest that regulative screenings for market stabilization are beneficial for SEO market timing, and that Chinese managers successfully time the market, even with a prolonged regulative process..
8. Yuhua Li, Konari Uchida, Tongsheng Xu, Zhaoyang Wu, The Impact of Foreign Entry on Chinese Banks, Review of Development Economics, 10.1111/rode.12219, 20, 1, 74-86, 2016.02, [URL].
9. Jianlei Liu, Konari Uchida, Ruidong Gao, Earnings management of IPO companies: Evidence from regulation changes in China, Accounting and Finance, 10.1111/acfi.12006, 54, 2, 505-537, 2014.06, [URL].
10. Jianlei Liu, Konari Uchida, Ruidong Gao, Legal protection and underpricing of IPOs: Evidence from China, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.02.006, 27, 163-187, 2014.04, [URL].
11. Liping Dong, Konari Uchida, Xiaohong Hou, Block trade targets in China, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.12.001, 25, 188-201, 2014.04, We examine characteristics associated with the probability of Chinese companies being block trade targets. We find that the proportion of non-publicly tradable shares over total outstanding shares is positively related to the probability of firms being block trade targets before the split-share structure reform. Ownership concentration, director ownership, and firm size were negatively related to the frequency of firms being block trade targets during the pre-reform period. Pre-reform firms with high free cash flow were likely to be block trade targets, and bidders paid a high premium to acquire those companies. The cost of a block trade increased significantly after the split-share structure reform, and the frequency of block trades declined considerably. These results suggest that before the reform Chinese bidders mainly pursued private benefits of control rather than capital gains from value-increasing takeovers. After the reform, bidders have bought tradable shares and paid a negative premium, suggesting that being a blockholder in Chinese companies implies costs that exceed benefits..
12. Chunyan Liu, Konari Uchida, Yufeng Yang, Controlling shareholder, Split-share structure reform and cash dividend payments in China, International Review of Economics and Finance, 10.1016/j.iref.2013.06.008, 29, 339-357, 2014.01, [URL].
13. Yuyang Zhang, Konari Uchida, Hua Bu, How do accounting standards and insiders' incentives affect earnings management? Evidence from China, Emerging Markets Review, 10.1016/j.ememar.2013.04.002, 16, 78-99, 2013.09, Chinese listed companies recently experienced two important institutional changes: split share structure reform (SSSR) and the mandatory adoption of IFRS-convergent new accounting standards (NAS). We find that the introduction of NAS significantly increased earnings management. Although we do not find evidence that SSSR directly decreased earnings management of the average firm, the increase in earnings management surrounding the introduction of NAS is negatively related to the reduction in non-tradable shares. These results suggest that accounting standards are the more important factor associated with the level of earnings management. Insiders' incentives affect earnings management given a specific set of accounting standards..
14. Yue Sun, Konari Uchida, Mamoru Matsumoto, The dark side of independent venture capitalists
Evidence from Japan, Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.02.001, 24, 279-300, 2013.09, Using Japanese firms that went public during the period 1998-2006, we find that independent venture capitalist-backed IPO firms are significantly younger and smaller than IPO companies backed by venture capital firms that are subsidiaries of financial institutions. IPOs backed by independent venture capitalists also tend to use less reputable underwriters and go public on stock exchanges with less strict listing requirements due to their immaturity. Young and small IPO companies experience significantly greater underpricing and poorer long-term operating performance. Taken all together, independent venture capitalists make lower quality companies go public than finance-affiliated venture capitalists..
15. Jianlei Liu, Konari Uchida, Ruidong Gao, Political connections and the long-term stock performance of Chinese IPOs, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions, & Money,, 22, 4, 814-833, 2012.10, [URL].
16. Determinants of board independence and its effect on firm performance.
17. Naohisa Goto, Konari Uchida, How do banks resolve firms' financial distress? Evidence from Japan, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 10.1007/s11156-011-0235-2, Vol. 38, No. 4, 455-478, 2012.04, [URL].
18. Chunyan Liu, Konari Uchida, Yufeng Yang, Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China, International Review of Financial Analysis, 10.1016/j.irfa.2011.11.002, Vol. 21, 70-80, 2012.01, [URL].
19. Konari Uchida, Does corporate board downsizing increase shareholder value? Evidence from Japan, International Review of Economics and Finance, 10.1016/j.iref.2010.10.003, 20, 4, 562-573, 2011.10, Japanese firms that have traditionally had large boards have recently become subject to pressures for small boards. This study shows that Japanese firms that substantially decreased board size tended to adopt an officer system and so did not substantially decrease the size of the management team (executive officers and directors). This tendency is especially evident for high-performing firms that face less information asymmetry. Japanese firms endogenously choose the change in the management team size when downsizing their boards. Firms that downsize boards do not show performance improvements, suggesting that board downsizing does not necessarily raise shareholder value..
20. How does regulation affect corporate governance?.
21. Shinya Shinozaki and Konari Uchida, Private benefits and board size: International evidence, Corporate Board: Roles, Duties, and Composition, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 109-124, 2011.05.
22. Daisuke Nogata, Konari Uchida, Naohisa Goto, Is corporate governance important for regulated firms' shareholders?. Evidence from Japanese mergers and acquisitions, Journal of Economics and Business, 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2010.08.002, 63, 1, 46-68, 2011.01, This paper compares the reaction of bidders' stock prices to acquisition announcements by regulated non-financial firms, banks, and unregulated companies in Japan. Results suggest that regulated non-financial firms do not experience a significant stock price response at merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements, although banks' and unregulated firms' M&A announcements are regarded favorably by the stock market. Furthermore, the effect of stock option usage and strict boards on the stock price response is weak for regulated non-financial bidders. The results provide additional evidence that regulation results in managerial decisions' having less influence on shareholder wealth and thereby changes the firm's optimal governance structure. In contrast, the results provide no clear evidence that, for bank bidders, there is a significantly stronger or weaker relationship between governance and the stock price response to an M&A announcement than that of unregulated firms or regulated non-financial firms. The result does not support the view that regulatory monitoring weakens the effect of ordinary governance mechanisms..
23. Kotaro Inoue, Konari Uchida, Marc Bremer, Post-restructuring performance in Japan, Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 10.1016/j.pacfin.2010.07.001, 18, 5, 494-508, 2010.11, Peek and Rosengren (2005) showed that after the end of the bubble economy era in Japan, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in "evergreening". Inoue et al. (2008) also showed that, compared to out-of-court settlements in the United States, agreements on out-of-court restructuring are attained more easily in Japan. However, widespread forbearance by banks and affiliated companies in addressing the needs of distressed firms indicated a serious weakness of banks and affiliated companies in instituting discipline. This is the first empirical study to examine the performance of Japanese firms that experienced out-of-court restructuring in Japan from January 1990, when the bubble economy burst, to March 2005, when the Koizumi Cabinet declared the bad debt problems of major firms to be resolved. Our results show that important biases permitted deeply unprofitable firms to survive in Japan. This finding is similar to research by Hotchkiss (1995), who analyzed post-restructuring performance in the United States. We also find that out-of-court restructurings of troubled firms in Japan were less effective in improving profitability than restructurings under Chapter 11 in the United States. However, we find that restructurings associated with new capital injections and new outside management are more likely to lead to genuine improvement in financial performance..
24. Bank shareholders and corporate governance.
25. Konari Uchida, Does corporate board downsizing increase shareholder value? Evidence from Japan, The Present Situation and Problems of East Asian Economy (Proceedings of the 4th Joint Conference of Kyushu University, Renmin University of China and Nanjing University), 69-93, 2009.11.
26. Financial and risk characteristics of stocks included in SRI funds.
27. Konari Uchida, The characteristics of online investors, Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol.7. pp.168-177, 2006.11, [URL].
28. Konari Uchida and Mamoru Matsumoto, Ownership structure and operating performance changes surrounding stock option adoptions: Evidence from Japan, Corporate Ownership & Control, vol. 4, 10-23 , 2006.11.
29. Konari Uchida and Peng Xu, US barbarians at the Japan Gate: Cross border hedge fund activism, Collection of Conference Papers (The All China Economics International Conference 2007) , 2007.12.
30. Konari Uchida, Determinants of stock option use by Japanese companies, Review of Financial Economics, 10.1016/j.rfe.2005.08.001, 15, 3, 251-269, 2006.08, Japanese data show a negative relation between leverage and the probability of firms' use of stock options. Such a relation is more marked for firms affiliated with specific keiretsu or main banks. This evidence reflects the fact that Japanese companies are more reliant on debt financing and that the agency cost of debt is a central issue in corporate governance. Results show that the frequency of the firms' use of stock options is positively associated with firm size. Finally, independent firms, which reveal more concern about shareholder wealth, are more likely to use stock options..