Taiki Todo | Last modified date:2023.11.27 |
Associate Professor /
Intelligent Systems
Department of Informatics
Faculty of Information Science and Electrical Engineering
Department of Informatics
Faculty of Information Science and Electrical Engineering
Graduate School
Undergraduate School
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Homepage
https://kyushu-u.elsevierpure.com/en/persons/taiki-todo
Reseacher Profiling Tool Kyushu University Pure
Fax
092-802-3576
Academic Degree
Doctor of Information Science
Country of degree conferring institution (Overseas)
No
Field of Specialization
Game Theory, Multi-Agent Systems
ORCID(Open Researcher and Contributor ID)
000-0003-3467-329X
Total Priod of education and research career in the foreign country
01years08months
Research
Research Interests
Membership in Academic Society
- Applying Game Theory into Mining Software Repositories
keyword : Game Theory, Mining Software Repositories
2014.10~2017.03. - Theory for Exchange of Multiple Indivisible Goods
keyword : Top-Trading-Cycles algorithm, exchange market, core assignments, kidney exchange
2014.04~2021.03. - Effect of False-Name Manipulations in Market Design Environments
keyword : Game Theory, Mechanism Design
2008.04.
Papers
Presentations
1. | Taiki Todo, Housing Markets over Social Networks, Dagstuhl Seminar 21241: Coalition Formation Games, 2021.06. |
2. | Taiki Todo, Social Choice with Variable Populations, The 23rd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-2020), 2020.11, [URL], Social choice theory is one of the well-studied mathematical foundations of decision making for multi-agent systems. In the literature of social choice theory, the number of agents in the system is usually assumed to be a constant, and different social choice functions can be applied to different populations. When the number of agents is treated as a variable, e.g., not observable a priori, however, a social choice function must be carefully designed so that it can accept any possible population as input. Indeed, for the open, anonymous, and dynamic environments, the number of agents is not likely observable for the decision maker. In this talk, I will review some traditional models of social choice, introduce possible extensions of them for variable populations, and discuss the relation with mechanism design.. |
3. | Taiki Todo, Market Design with Uncertainty, the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-PRICAI-2020), 2021.01, [URL], My research is summarized as mechanism design with uncertainty. Traditional mechanism design focuses on static environments where all the (possibly probabilistic) information about the agents are observable by the mechanism designer. In practice, however, it is possible that the set of participating agents and/or some of their actions are not observable a priori. We therefore focused on various kinds of uncertainty in mechanism design and developed/analyzed several market mechanisms that incentivise agents to behave in a sincere way.. |
4. | Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences, Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15), 2015.01. |
- Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
- Japan Society for Software Science and Technology
- The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
- Information Processing Society of Japan
Educational
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