九州大学 研究者情報
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基本情報 研究活動 教育活動 社会活動
高島 伸幸(たかしま のぶゆき) データ更新日:2019.11.20



主な研究テーマ
地域間国際提携の制度設計:ゲーム理論による分析
キーワード:地域政策、地方自治体、企業、技術、エネルギー、環境政策、国際提携、産学官連携、ゲーム理論
2019.09.
ゲーム理論を用いた水素エネルギー社会の実現に向けたモデル設計
キーワード:低炭素社会,次世代自動車,水素エネルギー,国際環境協定,ゲーム理論
2019.03.
汚染削減技術改善に向けた国際的なR&D投資の制度設計
キーワード:R&D,技術移転,国際環境協定,技術協定,ゲーム理論
2019.01.
国際環境協定の制度設計
キーワード:国際環境協定;越境汚染;繰り返しゲーム
2011.04.
研究業績
主要著書
1. Nobuyuki Takashima (担当:分担執筆, 範囲:Sustainable international cooperation with ancillary benefits of climate policy),, Wolfgang Buchholz, Anli Markandya, Dirk Rübbelke, Stefan Vögele (Eds.) Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy,
Nobuyuki Takashima 他, Springer, Forthcoming
, Springer, 2020.01.
主要原著論文
1. Nobuyuki Takashima, Cooperative R&D investments and licensing breakthrough technologies: International environmental agreements with participation game, Journal of Cleaner Production, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119233, forthcoming.
2. Nobuyuki Takashima, International environmental agreements between asymmetric countries: a repeated game analysis, Japan and the World Economy, 10.1016/j.japwor.2018.08.001, 48, 38-44, 2018.12, This paper introduces a new approach to performing a relaxed analysis using a repeated game to achieve an international environmental agreement (IEA) with the full participation of countries when an asymmetric relationship exists with respect to emissions related benefits and environmental damage. Our model reveals that a stable IEA depends on the magnitude of the relationship between the benefit cost ratios of the two types of countries, not on their compositions. That is, the number of punishing countries for a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium depends on the benefit cost ratios of the two types of countries. Our results show that a global cooperation on abatement among the two types of countries can be achieved by addressing deviation through flexibly selecting punishing countries based on benefit cost ratios..
3. Nobuyuki, Takashima, The Impact of Accidental Deviation by Natural Disaster-Prone Countries on Renegotiation-Proof Climate Change Agreements, Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 10.1007/s10666-016-9542-2, 22, 4, 345-361, 2017.08, This study provides a new framework for international
environmental agreements (IEAs), which include punishment
exceptions for accidental deviation, using repeated
games. We consider that deviation from an agreement can
occur accidentally because of phenomena such as natural disasters,
even if the agreement is sustained as a weakly
renegotiation-proof equilibrium. If an IEA signatory deviates
accidentally, it fails to achieve its emission abatement target.
In the repeated game, a cooperative relationship among signatories
is sustained by a strategy that prescribes rules of cooperation
and punishment for deviation. We present a new
strategy, called Regional Cooperative, which integrates accidental
deviations into an IEA. Our model reveals that
punishing countries tend to revoke the punishment of deviators
and return to cooperation if an accidental deviator increases
its abatement volume. That is, the abatement efforts
of the accidental deviator can lead to renegotiation. The
Regional Cooperative strategy motivates the accidental deviator
to try to engage in abatement and the punishing countries
to restart cooperation by renegotiation. We conclude that social
welfare loss by punishment is prevented through renegotiation
in cases of accidental deviation..
4. Nobuyuki, Takashima, International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis, Economic Modelling, 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.10.011, 61, 312-320, 2017.02, Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to
implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new
IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost
functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full
participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our
main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should
be considered in climate change negotiations..
主要学会発表等
1. @Nobuyuki Takashima, Multiple regional agreements: repeated game analysis, 日本地域学会, 2017.10.
2. @Nobuyuki Takashima, The impact of altruism on international environmental agreement with full participation:.Repeated game model, 日本経済学会, 2017.09.
3. @Nobuyuki, Takashima, Can global cooperation for climate change among all developed and developing countries be achieved?, the East Asian Association of Environmental Resource Economics, 2016.08.
4. @高島伸幸, すべての国が加盟する弱い再交渉が防止された国際環境協定-先進国と途上国が存在する場合, 日本応用経済学会, 2016.06.
学会活動
所属学会名
Regional Science Association International
日本LCA学会
日本地域学会
日本経済学会
日本経済政策学会
九州経済学会
日本応用経済学会
環境経済政策学会
学会大会・会議・シンポジウム等における役割
2019.09.13~2019.10.15, 日本地域学会第56回(2019年)年次大会 , 実行委員.
2019.03.05~2019.03.07, 第14回日本LCA学会研究発表会(九州大学), 実行委員.
2016.06.25~2016.06.26, 2016年度日本応用経済学会 春季大会, 実行委員.
学術論文等の審査
年度 外国語雑誌査読論文数 日本語雑誌査読論文数 国際会議録査読論文数 国内会議録査読論文数 合計
2019年度      
受賞
日本地域学会学会賞 学位論文賞(博士論文賞) (The Award of Doctroal Thesis of the Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International (JSRSAI)), 日本地域学会 (The Japan Section of the Regional Science Association International (JSRSAI)), 2018.10.
環境経済・政策学会 奨励賞 (The Award of Young Achievement Award of Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies), 環境経済・政策学会 (Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies), 2018.09.
環境経済政策学会(SEEPS) 「研究促進のための学会報告を行う若手研究者への学会参加旅費支援制度」による支援, 環境経済政策学会(SEEPS), 2015.08.
日本応用経済学会 奨励賞 (The Award of Young Achievement Award of Japan Association for Applied Economics), 日本応用経済学会 (Japan Association for Applied Economics), 2017.06.
研究資金
科学研究費補助金の採択状況(文部科学省、日本学術振興会以外)
2019年度~2022年度, 若手研究, 代表, 長期的な安定性を考慮した国際環境協定の制度設計.

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