Updated on 2025/09/08

Information

 

写真a

 
HUANG XIN
 
Organization
Faculty of Information Science and Electrical Engineering Department of Informatics Assistant Professor
Title
Assistant Professor

Papers

  • Improved maximin share approximations for chores by bin packing Reviewed International coauthorship International journal

    2025.4

    　More details

    Authorship：Lead author   Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)   Publisher：Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence  

    We study fair division of indivisible chores among n agents with additive cost functions using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist for more than two agents, the goal has been to improve its approximations and identify interesting special cases where MMS allocations exists.

    DOI： https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33518

    Repository Public URL： https://hdl.handle.net/2324/7385205

    Open data URL： https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v39i13.33518

  • A discrete and bounded locally envy-free cake cutting protocol on trees

    Ganesh Ghalme, Xin Huang, Yuka Machino, Nidhi Rathi

    2023.12

    　More details

    Authorship：Corresponding author  

  • A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling International coauthorship

    Huang, Xin, Erel Segal-Halevi

    In Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation   2023.7

    　More details

    Authorship：Corresponding author   Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

    DOI： https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597676

  • On picking sequences for chores

    Uriel Feige, Xin Huang

    2023.7

    　More details

    Authorship：Corresponding author  

  • An algorithmic framework for approximating maximin share allocation of chores

    Xin Huang, Pinyan Lu

    2021.7

    　More details

    Authorship：Corresponding author  

  • Whoever Said Money Won't Solve All Your Problems? Weighted Envy-free Allocation with Subsidy Reviewed International coauthorship International journal

    2025.9

    　More details

    Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)   Publisher：International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory 2025  

    Fair division of indivisible items arises in settings like inheritance, divorce, and partnership dissolutions. A central fairness notion is
    envy-freeness (EF). Since EF is often impossible with indivisible items, a common remedy is to provide subsidies—monetary compensation from a third party. In the unweighted setting, prior work showed that any allocation can be made EF with bounded subsidies (Halpern and Shah (2019), “Fair Division with Subsidy”), and gave efficient algorithms for computing such EF-able allocations (Brustle et al. (2020), “One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy”). We extend the EF-with-subsidies framework to agents with unequal en
    titlements, modeled as positive weights.

    Repository Public URL： https://hdl.handle.net/2324/7385217

  • Unified fair allocation of goods and chores via copies

    Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

    2023.12

    　More details

    Authorship：Corresponding author  

  • Computing welfare-maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods

    Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi

    2023.6

▼display all