Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit unit-demand auction, except for some naı̈ve ones. In this paper, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with two naı̈ve mechanisms, showing that the proposed mechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller’s revenue, and incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the constant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of optimizing revenue from the seller’s perspective.

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Core-selection is a crucial property of rules in the literature of resource allocation. It is also desirable, from the perspective of mechanism design, to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. this paper investigates the exchange problem where (i) each agent is initially endowed with (possibly multiple) indivisible goods, (ii) agents' preferences are assumed to be conditionally lexicographic, and (iii) side payments are prohibited. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC), based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that ATTC is core-selecting and runs in polynomial time with respect to the number of goods. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under ATTC is NP-hard. We finally clarify relationship of misreporting with splitting and hiding, two different types of manipulations, under ATTC.

DOI： 10.1613/jair.1.11254

Publisher：International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence  

Diffusion mechanism design is one of the recent trends in the literature of mechanism design. Its purpose is to incentivize agents to diffuse the information about the mechanism to as many followers as possible, as well as reporting their preferences. This paper is the first attempt to consider diffusion mechanism design for two-sided matching from the perspective of non-obvious manipulability. We focus on the top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism for the many-to-one two-sided matching problem. We clarify the necessary and sufficient condition for the mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and non-obvious manipulability, respectively. We also propose a new TTC-based matching mechanism that violates strategy-proofness but satisfies non-obvious manipulability, which illustrates how we can handle strategic information diffusion in two-sided matching.

DOI： 10.5220/0013319100003890

Scopus

Publisher：International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence  

This paper investigates which coalition structure generation algorithms guarantee the incentive of agents to invite as many colleagues as possible in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. We first clarify that, the incentive of invitation is not compatible with each of Nash stability and Pareto efficiency. Furthermore, we show that the worst-case ratio of social surplus achieved by any algorithm satisfying the incentive of invitation, compared to the best possible social surplus, is unboundedly small. We then introduce two problem restrictions to achieve somewhat positive results. More specifically, we showed that, when the utility graph of a hedonic game only contains three values, {−p,0,p}, for some positive number p, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to achieve both the incentive of invitation and 1/n-approximation with respect to the social surplus.

DOI： 10.5220/0013320400003890

Scopus

Authorship：Corresponding author  

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  

<p>In this presentation, we consider a facility location game on a one-dimensional line segment, i.e., a problem in which participating agents declare their positions on a one-dimensional line segment and a mechanism determines the placement of facilities based on these declarations. In particular, we focus on the ordered weighted average (OWA) mechanisms and discuss its non-obvious manipulability. An OWA mechanism is a mechanism that orders the agent's reported values in ascending order, applies weights according to that order, and returns the sum of the weights. In this presentation, we analyze how the non-obvious manipulability changes by changing the weights in an OWA.</p>

DOI： 10.11517/pjsai.jsai2024.0_2f6gs502

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  

<p>It is known that there is no stable algorithm that satisfy strategy-proofness in the two-sided matching with information diffusion. In this research, we examine the existence of stable algorithms by weakening the incentive requirement. More precisely, we show that even the non-obvious manipulability property is not achievable by stable algorithms.</p>

DOI： 10.11517/pjsai.jsai2024.0_1i3gs504

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  

<p>Diffusion mechanism design is a new research paradigm in the literature of mechanism design, which aims to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues as possible to participate in a mechanism. An existing work on diffusion mechanism design for facility location games showed that there is no mechanism that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and full anonymity, as well as proposed two naive mechanisms that satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency by ignoring the full anonymity property. In this paper we aim to reveal to what extent strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms could be anonymous. We first define a class of anonymity properties by introducing a concept of partitions of the set of participating agents, and clarify a sufficient condition on partitions that guarantees the existence of mechanisms satisfying an anonymity property, as well as strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency.</p>

DOI： 10.11517/pjsai.jsai2024.0_3xin250

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：THE INSTITUTE OF SYSTEMS, CONTROL AND INFORMATION ENGINEERS  

DOI： 10.11509/isciesci.67.1_2

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  

<p>Diffusion mechanism design is a new research paradigm in the literature of mechanism design, which aims to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues as possible to participate in a mechanism. In this paper we apply diffusion mechanism design to the facility location game, one of the most well-studied model in MAS domain. We first provide a general impossibility result on the existence of possibly randomized facility location mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and fully anonymous. We then present two strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy some weaker notions of anonymity.</p>

DOI： 10.11517/pjsai.jsai2023.0_1f3gs503

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  

<p>Hedonic games are mathematical models in which a group of agents is divided into appropriate subgroups, and have been studied as a field of cooperative games. Cooperative games with permission structures, on the other hand, are models in which an agent’s participation in a game is by permission of another agent. In this paper, we introduce a permission structure into SASHG, a type of hedonic game, and consider solutions to hedonic games in which information diffusion, i.e., the incentive to issue as many permissions as possible, holds. Specifically, we first show that Nash stable solutions and information diffusion are incompatible. Given this impossibility, we propose an algorithm with incentives for information diffusion and show the approximate rate of social surplus that can be achieved. As a result, we show the incompatibility theorem of social surplus maximization and Nash stability with incentives for information diffusion, and furthermore, we show that the achievable approximation rate is 0.</p>

DOI： 10.11517/pjsai.jsai2023.0_2f4gs503

CiNii Research

CiNii Research

CiNii Research

CiNii Research

Language：Japanese   Publisher：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence  

<p>The multi-agent pathfinding (MAPF) problem takes as input a set of agents with different starts and goals, and assigns a path that does not cause conflicts among the agents. There is a powerful exact algorithm called Meta-Agent Conflict Based Search (MA-CBS) for minimizing the sum of the costs for each agent to reach the goal, which is known to be NP-hard. The behavior of MA-CBS varies depending on a condition called the merge policy, but it is known that it requires a huge amount of execution time for some MAPF instances under the conventional static merge policy. In this paper, we propose a new merge policy that dynamically changes the properties of the algorithm, and show by computer experiments that the algorithm that implements the proposed merge policy runs efficiently on more various instances than the conventional one.</p>

DOI： 10.11517/pjsai.jsai2022.0_1n1gs503

CiNii Research

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

In many real-life scenarios, a group of agents needs to agree on a common action, e.g., on a location for a public facility, while there is some consistency between their preferences, e.g., all preferences are derived from a common metric space. The facility location problem models such scenarios and it is a well-studied problem in social choice. We study mechanisms for facility location on unweighted undirected graphs, which are resistant to manipulations (strategy-proof, abstention-proof, and false-name-proof) by both individuals and coalitions and are efficient (Pareto optimal). We define a family of graphs, ZV-line graphs, and show a general facility location mechanism for these graphs which satisfies all these desired properties. Our result unifies the few works in the literature of false-name-proof facility location on discrete graphs including the preliminary (unpublished) works we are aware of.

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

In this paper, we study the service exchange problem where each agent is willing to provide her service in order to receive in exchange the service of someone else. We assume that agent’s preference depends both on the service that she receives and the person who receives her service. This framework is an extension of the housing market problem to preferences including a degree of externalities. We investigate the complexity of computing an individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation of services to agents for ordinal preferences, and the complexity of computing an allocation which maximizes either the utility sum or the utility of the least served agent for cardinal preferences.

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

The cake cutting problem is concerned with the fair allocation of a divisible good among agents whose preferences vary over it. Recently, designing strategy-proof cake cutting mechanisms has caught considerable attention from AI and MAS researchers. Previous works assumed that an agent's utility function is additive so that theoretical analysis becomes tractable. However, in practice, agents have non-additive utility over a resource. In this paper, we consider the all-or-nothing utility function as a representative example of non-additive utility because it can widely cover agents' preferences for such real-world resources as the usage of meeting rooms, time slots for computational resources, bandwidth usage, and so on. We first show the incompatibility between envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency when each agent has all-or-nothing utility. We next propose two strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy Pareto efficiency, which are based on the serial dictatorship mechanism, at the sacrifice of envy-freeness. To address computational feasibility, we propose a heuristic-based allocation algorithm to find a near-optimal allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, since the problem of finding a Pareto efficient allocation is NP-hard. As another approach that abandons Pareto efficiency, we develop an envy-free mechanism and show that one of our serial dictatorship based mechanisms satisfies proportionality in expectation, which is a weaker definition of proportionality. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency obtained by our proposed mechanisms by computational experiments.

DOI： 10.3233/FI-2018-1641

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

The cake cutting problem is concerned with the fair allocation of a divisible good among agents whose preferences vary over it. Recently, designing strategy-proof (SP) cake cutting mechanisms has caught considerable attention from AI and MAS researchers. Previous works assumed that an agent’s utility function is additive so that theoretical analysis becomes tractable. However, in practice, agents have non-additive utility over a resource. In this paper, we consider the all-or-nothing utility function as a representative example of non-additive utility because it can widely cover agents’ preferences for such real-world resources as the usage of meeting rooms, time slots for computational resources, bandwidth usage, and so on. We first show the incompatibility between envy-freeness (EF) and Pareto efficiency (PE) when each agent has all-or-nothing utility. We next propose a SP mechanism that satisfy PE, which is based on the serial dictatorship mechanism, at the sacrifice of EF. To address computational feasibility, we propose a heuristic-based allocation algorithm to find a near-optimal allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, since the problem of finding a PE allocation is NP-hard. As another approach that abandons PE, we develop an EF and SP mechanism. Furthermore, we argue about false-name-proofness (FNP), which is the expansion of SP, and propose FNP and EF cake cutting mechanism. Finally, we evaluate our proposed mechanisms by computational experiments.

DOI： 10.1527/tjsai.AG16-E

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Other Link： http://www.ecai2014.org/

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (international conference proceedings)  

Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

Event date： 2018.11

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：愛知県名古屋市・ミッドランドスクエア   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2018.9

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：公立諏訪東京理科大学   Country：Japan  

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Austin, Texas   Country：United States  

Event date： 2021.6

Language：English   Presentation type：Public lecture, seminar, tutorial, course, or other speech  

Venue：オンライン  

Event date： 2018.7

Language：English  

Venue：Stockholm   Country：Sweden  

In this paper, we study the service exchange problem where each agent is willing to provide her service in order to receive in exchange the service of someone else. We assume that agent's preference depends both on the service that she receives and the person who receives her service. This framework is an extension of the housing market problem to preferences including a degree of externalities. We investigate the complexity of computing an individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation of services to agents for ordinal preferences, and the complexity of computing an allocation which maximizes either the utility sum or the utility of the least served agent for cardinal preferences.

Event date： 2018.7

Language：English  

Venue：Stockholm   Country：Sweden  

Facility location is a well-studied problem in social choice literature. where agents' preferences are restricted to be single-peaked. When the number of agents is treated as a variable (e.g., not observable a priori), a social choice function must be defined so that it can accept any possible number of preferences as input. Furthermore, there exist cases where multiple choices must be made continuously while agents dynamically arrive/leave. Under such variable and dynamic populations, a social choice function needs to give each agent an incentive to sincerely report her existence. In this paper we investigate facility location models with variable and dynamic populations. For a static, i.e., one-shot, variable population model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice function to satisfy participation, as well as truthfulness, anonymity, and Pareto efficiency. The condition is given as a further restriction on the well-known median voter schemes. For a dynamic model, we first propose an online social choice function, which is optimal for the total sum of the distances between the choices in the previous and current periods, among any Pareto efficient functions. We then define a generalized class of online social choice functions and compare their performances both theoretically and experimentally.

Event date： 2018.2

Language：English  

Venue：New Orleans   Country：United States  

In this paper, we propose a fractional preference model for the facility location game with two facilities that serve the similar purpose on a line where each agent has his location information as well as fractional preference to indicate how well they prefer the facilities. The preference for each facility is in the range of [0, L] such that the sum of the preference for all facilities is equal to 1. The utility is measured by subtracting the sum of the cost of both facilities from the total length L where the cost of facilities is defined as the multiplication of the fractional preference and the distance between the agent and the facilities. We first show that the lower bound for the objective of mini-1 mizing total cost is at least Ω(n3). Hence, we use the utility function to analyze the agents' satification. Our objective is to place two facilities on [0, L] to maximize the social utility or the minimum utility. For each objective function, we propose deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms. For the objective of maximizing the social utility, we present an optimal deterministic strategy-proof mechanism in the case where agents can only misreport their locations. In the case where agents can only misreport their preferences, we present a 2-approximation deterministic strategy-proof mechanism. Finally, we present a 4-approximation deterministic strategyproof mechanism and a randomized strategy-proof mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2 where agents can misreport both the preference and location information. Moreover, we also give a lower-bound of 1.06. For the objective of maximizing the minimum utility, we give a lower-bound of 1.5 and present a 2-approximation deterministic strategyproof mechanism where agents can misreport both the preference and location.

Event date： 2017.10 - 2017.11

Language：English  

Venue：Nice   Country：France  

We consider the problem of locating facilities on a discrete acyclic graph, where agents’ locations are publicly known and the agents are requested to report their demands, i.e., which facilities they want to access. In this paper, we study the effect of manipulations by agents that utilize vacant vertices. Such manipulations are called rename or false-name manipulations in game theory and mechanism design literature. For locating one facility on a path, we carefully compare our model with traditional ones and clarify their differences by pointing out that some existing results in the traditional model do not carry over to our model. For locating two facilities, we analyze the existing and new mechanisms from a perspective of approximation ratio and provide non-trivial lower bounds. Finally, we introduce a new mechanism design model where richer information is available to the mechanism designer and show that under the new model false-name-proofness does not always imply population monotonicity.

Event date： 2016.8

Language：English  

Venue：Phuket   Country：Thailand  

We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.

Event date： 2016.6

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Schloss Dagstuhl   Country：Germany  

Event date： 2016.6

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：北九州国際会議場   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2016.5 - 2017.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Tokyo   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2016.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Singapore   Country：Singapore  

Event date： 2016.2

Language：English  

Venue：Phoenix   Country：United States  

This paper considers a mechanism design problem for locating two identical facilities on an interval, in which an agent can pretend to be multiple agents. A mechanism selects a pair of locations on the interval according to the declared singlepeaked preferences of agents. An agent's utility is determined by the location of the better one (typically the closer to her ideal point). This model can represent various application domains. For example, assume a company is going to release two models of its product line and performs a questionnaire survey in an online forum to determine their detailed specs. Typically, a customer will buy only one model, but she can answer multiple times by logging onto the forum under several email accounts. We first characterize possible outcomes of mechanisms that satisfy false-name-proofness, as well as some mild conditions. By extending the result, we completely characterize the class of false-name-proof mechanisms when locating two facilities on a circle.We then clarify the approximation ratios of the false-name-proof mechanisms on a line metric for the social and maximum costs. 1 Introduction.

Event date： 2015.10

Language：English  

Venue：Bertinoro   Country：Italy  

The cake cutting problem must fairly allocate a divisible good among agents who have varying preferences over it. Recently, designing strategy-proof cake cutting mechanisms has caught considerable attention from AI and MAS researchers. Previous works assumed that an agent’s utility function is additive so that theoretical analysis becomes tractable. However, in practice, agents have non-additive utility functions over a resource. In this paper, we consider the allor-nothing utility function as a representative example of non-additive utility because it can widely cover agents’ preferences for real-world resources, such as the usage of meeting rooms, time slots for computational resources, bandwidth usage, and so on. We first show the incompatibility between envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency when each agent has all-or-nothing utility. We next propose two strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy Pareto efficiency, which are based on a serial dictatorship mechanism, at the sacrifice of envy-freeness. To address computational feasibility, we propose an approximation algorithm to find a near-optimal allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, since the problem of finding a Pareto efficient allocation is NP-hard. As another approach that abandon Pareto efficiency, we develop an envy-free mechanism and show that one of our serial dictatorship based mechanisms satisfies proportionality in expectation, which is a weaker definition of proportionality. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency obtained by our proposed mechanisms by computational experiments.

Event date： 2015.7

Language：English  

Venue：Buenos Aires   Country：Argentina  

In this paper we study the exchange of indivisible objects where agents' possible preferences over the objects are strict and share a common structure among all of them, which represents a certain level of asymmetry among objects. A typical example of such an exchange model is a re-scheduling of tasks over several processors, since all task owners are naturally assumed to prefer that their tasks are assigned to fast processors rather than slow ones. We focus on designing exchange rules (a.k.a. mechanisms) that simultaneously satisfy strategyproofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. We first provide a general impossibility result for agents' preferences that are determined in an additive manner, and then show an existence of such an exchange rule for further restricted lexicographic preferences. We finally find that for the restricted case, a previously known equivalence between the single-valuedness of the strict core and the existence of such an exchange rule does not carry over.

Event date： 2015.5

Language：English  

Venue：Florence   Country：Italy  

How can we attract developers? What can we do to incentivize developers to write code? We started the study by introducing the population pyramid visualization to software development communities, called software population pyramids, and found a typical pattern in shapes. This pattern comes from the differences in attracting coding contributors and discussion contributors. To understand the causes of the differences, we then build game-theoretical models of the contribution situation. Based on these results, we again analyzed the projects empirically to support the outcome of the models, and found empirical evidence. The answers to the initial questions are clear. To incentivize developers to code, the projects should prepare documents, or the projects or third parties should hire developers, and these are what sustainable projects in Git Hub did in reality. In addition, making innovations to reduce the writing costs can also have an impact in attracting coding contributors.

Event date： 2015.1

Language：English  

Venue：Austin   Country：United States  

Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are not allowed. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under the ATTC procedure is NP-hard. Under the ATTC procedure, we finally clarify the relationship between preference misreport and splitting, which is a different type of manipulation.

Event date： 2014.11

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Pittsuburgh, Pennsylvania   Country：United States  

Event date： 2014.10

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：ANA ホリデイ・イン リゾート 宮崎   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2014.10

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：ANA ホリデイ・イン リゾート 宮崎   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2014.10

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：ANA ホリデイ・イン リゾート 宮崎   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2014.8

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Prague   Country：Czech Republic  

Other Link： http://www.ecai2014.org/

Event date： 2014.7

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Quebec   Country：Canada  

Event date： 2014.7

Language：Others   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Quebec   Country：Canada  

Other Link： http://www.aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI/aaai14.php

Event date： 2014.5

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：愛媛県 ひめぎんホール   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2014.5

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：愛媛県 ひめぎんホール   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2014.5

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：愛媛県 ひめぎんホール   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2014.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Paris   Country：France  

Event date： 2014.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Paris   Country：France  

Event date： 2014.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Paris   Country：France  

Event date： 2014.3

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Warsaw   Country：Poland  

Event date： 2013.11

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Keio University   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2013.6

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：富山県 富山国際会議場   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2013.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Minnesota   Country：United States  

Event date： 2013.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Minnesota   Country：United States  

Event date： 2013.2

Language：English  

Venue：Duke University   Country：United States  

Event date： 2013.2

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Duke University   Country：United States  

Event date： 2012.10

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Boston   Country：United States  

Event date： 2012.6

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Valencia   Country：Spain  

Event date： 2012.6

Language：English  

Venue：Valencia   Country：Spain  

Event date： 2012.6

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Valencia   Country：Spain  

Event date： 2012.4

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Duke University   Country：United States  

Event date： 2011.9

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：兵庫県 甲南大学   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2011.9

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：北海道 函館大学   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2011.8

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：北海道大学   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2011.7

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Barcelona   Country：Spain  

Event date： 2011.6

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：岩手県 アイーナ いわて県民情報交流センター   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2011.6

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：岩手県 アイーナ いわて県民情報交流センター   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2011.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Taipei   Country：Taiwan, Province of China  

Event date： 2010.12

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Stanford University   Country：United States  

Event date： 2010.10

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Hokkaido   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2010.10

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Hitotsubashi University   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2010.9

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：福岡県 九州大学   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2010.9

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：九州大学   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2010.9

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Toronto   Country：Canada  

Event date： 2010.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Toronto   Country：Canada  

Event date： 2010.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Toronto   Country：Canada  

Event date： 2010.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Toronto   Country：Canada  

Event date： 2010.4

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Estoril   Country：Portugal  

Event date： 2010.3

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：福岡県 九州大学   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2009.12

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Rome   Country：Italy  

Event date： 2009.10

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：北海道 ラフォーレ蔵王リゾート＆スパ   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2009.9

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Hitotsubashi University   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2009.6

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：香川県 サンポートホール高松   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2009.6

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：東京工業大学大岡山キャンパス   Country：Japan  

Event date： 2009.5

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Budapest   Country：Hungary  

Event date： 2008.10

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：滋賀県 大津プリンスホテル   Country：Japan  

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Istanbul   Country：Turkey  

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Istanbul   Country：Turkey  

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Istanbul   Country：Turkey  

Language：English   Presentation type：Symposium, workshop panel (public)  

Venue：Florence   Country：Italy  

Language：English   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：Buenos Aires   Country：Argentina  

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：函館   Country：Japan  

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：函館   Country：Japan  

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (general)  

Venue：函館   Country：Japan  

Language：English   Presentation type：Symposium, workshop panel (public)  

Venue：Seoul   Country：Korea, Republic of  

Language：Japanese   Presentation type：Oral presentation (invited, special)  

Venue：名古屋   Country：Japan  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc.  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Internal/External technical report, pre-print, etc.  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal)  

Language：Japanese   Publishing type：Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (scientific journal)  

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Academic society, research group, etc. 

Type：Peer review 

Number of peer-reviewed articles in foreign language journals：3

Number of peer-reviewed articles in Japanese journals：2

Proceedings of International Conference Number of peer-reviewed papers：13

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Peer review 

Number of peer-reviewed articles in foreign language journals：2

Number of peer-reviewed articles in Japanese journals：2

Proceedings of International Conference Number of peer-reviewed papers：16

Proceedings of domestic conference Number of peer-reviewed papers：2

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Number of participants：60

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc. 

Type：Competition, symposium, etc.