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Tsung-ming Yeh, Large shareholders, shareholder proposals, and firm performance
Evidence from Japan, Corporate Governance：An International Review, 10.1111/corg.12052, 22, 4, 312-329, 2014.01, Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Previous studies, primarily based on evidence from the United States, fail to link shareholder activism to firm performance, with one explanatory factor being that the legal and regulatory system in the United States limits the anti-director rights of shareholders. This study is motivated by the question of whether legally binding shareholder resolutions can pressure management to improve firm performance and to enhance firm value. Research Findings/Insights: By investigating 135 publicly listed Japanese firms which received shareholder resolutions from 2004 to 2010, this study finds supportive evidence for shareholder proposals. Announcement-associated abnormal returns are higher for firms receiving election-related proposals by large sponsors, than those unrelated to board election. Furthermore, an improving trend begins to appear in the post-resolution year, particularly significant for firms receiving proposals to remove board members. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides new evidence suggesting that large shareholder activism in Corporate Japan can perform roles that used to be played by main banks before the 1990s. It also suggests that in countries where there is no active takeover market, large shareholders can effectively discipline entrenched management through active engagement. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to corporate managers on the importance of communicating with large shareholders and addressing their concerns.. |
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Tsung-ming Yeh, Determinants and consequences of shareholder proposals
The cases of board election, charter amendment, and profit disposal, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.004, 45, 245-261, 2017.08, By investigating shareholder proposals in Japan during 2004–2013, this study aims to address the question whether exercising legally powerful shareholder rights has an impact on the management. Compared with their counterparts in the United States, Japanese shareholders are entitled to more statutory rights, including binding shareholder resolutions on issues relating to board election, charter amendment, and profit disposal. The empirical tests reveal several important results. First, different types of shareholder proposals are triggered by varying firm characteristics. Second, resolutions on the board election and charter amendments relating to corporate governance receive higher votes than those for profit disposal. Voting outcome is also positively associated with foreign shareholding, duration of the general meeting, and the firm's history of receiving proposals. Moreover, resolutions initiated by large shareholders have positive impacts on the target firms, which reported positive announcement-associated abnormal returns. Improvements in the operating performance are observed for firms passing board election resolutions and firms receiving charter amendment proposals from large shareholders. The management also increased share buyback and dividend payout in response to demands by large shareholders, although there was no significant change in the post-resolution operating performance. Overall, the results indicate that statutorily powerful shareholder rights, when exercised by large shareholders, can have a positive impact.. |
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Tsung-ming Yeh, Do Private Equity Funds Increase Firm Value?
Evidence from Japanese Leveraged Buyouts, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 10.1111/j.1745-6622.2012.00405.x, 24, 4, 2012.12, Abstract
The author summarizes the findings of his recent study of 62 buyouts of listed Japanese companies by both Japanese and “foreign” private equity funds that were transacted between 2000 and 2007. Roughly half of the author's sample of transactions were accomplished by means of takeover bids by PE funds, and such deals were transacted at prices that represented a premium (of roughly 12%) to current market values. Most of the other PE transactions were privately negotiated deals in which the purchase prices involved discounts (of about 15% on average) to current value. For both sets of deals, however, the announcements of such buyouts were associated, on average, with a significantly positive stock market reaction.
By the cutoff date of the study (May 2010), 30 of the 62 acquired firms had realized “exits.” Those companies (though not the others) experienced significant average improvements in operating performance; and the extent of such improvements were roughly consistent with the size of the positive market reaction to the buyout announcements. The test results suggest that the value increases can be attributed to the more efficient use of assets and reduction of operating costs. Meanwhile, there was no evidence suggesting that the acquired firms cut back on their research and development, capital investments, or employee wages and growth. What's more, examination of the operating performance of the 30 companies after their exits showed no deterioration in profitability or investment spending.. |
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Tsung-ming Yeh, The effects of anti-takeover measures on Japanese corporations, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 10.1007/s11156-013-0361-0, 42, 2, 2014.05. |
