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Nobuaki Hori Last modified date：2023.11.22

Associate Professor / Policy Analysis
Department of Economic Engineering
Faculty of Economics


Graduate School
Department of Economic Engineering
Graduate School of Economics
Undergraduate School
Department of Economic Engineering
School of Economics


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Homepage
https://kyushu-u.elsevierpure.com/en/persons/nobuaki-hori
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Phone
092-802-5479
Academic Degree
Master of Economics
Field of Specialization
Political Economy, Econbomics of Cultural Evolution, Microeconomic Theory
Total Priod of education and research career in the foreign country
01years00months
Outline Activities
See "Educational Activities" and "Main Research Fields"
Research
Research Interests
  • Political Economy of Religion
    keyword : Political economy Religion
    2016.04.
  • Economics of Cultural Evolution
    keyword : Cultural Evolution, Cultural Transmission, Socialization
    2014.04.
  • Microeconomic Theory
    keyword : Microeconomics, Game Theory
    2016.04.
Academic Activities
Books
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Papers
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1. Kenichi Kurita, Nobuaki Hori, Yuya Katafuchi, Stigma model of welfare fraud and non‐take‐up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data, International Journal of Economic Theory, 10.1111/ijet.12295, 2020.11.
2. Hori Nobuaki, Political regime change and cultural transmission of secularism, Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, 1, 2, 431-450, 2017.10, This paper develops a theory of the intergenerational transmission of the cultural value of secularism and its interaction with endogenous regime shifts between democracies and dictatorships. Religious citizens negatively value the personal and public use of “civil liberties” and secular citizens positively value such use, and the degree of civil liberties afforded is restricted by a politically determined legal cap (limitation) depending on the regime. The attitudes toward liberties are transmitted across generations, and governments can intervene in the directions of the cultural transmission. Civil liberties promote secular citizens’ investments and contribute to expanding the economy, which is a central concern of dictatorships. Religious citizens are more likely to prefer a religious society with a severe cap on civil liberties. The possibility that secular citizens prefer a secular dictatorship to a religious democracy makes a religious democracy more vulnerable to dictatorships. As a result, there could be a “weaker secularization cycle” in which secularization under dictatorships and de-secularization under religious democracies alternately happen. In this case, paradoxically, the nation needs to stay with a secular dictatorship for a long time and foster sufficient secularism to consolidate a future democracy..
3. Nobuaki Hori, Peseth Seng, Social Capital, Resource Boom, and Underdevelopment Traps, Applied Approach to the Issues of Societal Institution and Economy: Essays in Honor of Moriki Hosoe. Tohru Naito, Woohyung Lee, Yasunori Ouchida (eds.) , 2017.09, This paper develops a model of intergenerational cultural transmission of underdevelopment traps. This model provides the analysis on the interaction between the development of social capital (trustworthiness) and the development of traditional production (natural resource-based and agricultural production) looking from the perspective of cultural economics. Some reforms or policies that may lead to the development of traditional production vis-à-vis that of the modern production may ruin the development of social capital, which eventually causes the economy to be caught in the traps of low social capital and less efficient production..
4. Nobuaki Hori, Peseth Seng, Institution, Foreign Investment and Resource Curse: Do Source Countries' Institutions Matter?, Asia Pacific Business & Economics Perspectives, Winter 2014 2, 2, 6-19, 2015.03, Resource abundance tends to be a curse for nations with poor institution.
Most of resource-rich nations with weak institution are poor and lacks of
capital. They mainly rely on foreign investment for resource extraction. This
paper develops a simple model by incorporating foreign investment into
resource curse literature. We argue that source countries' institutions of
foreign investors do matter. The prevalence of foreign investors from
countries with poor institutions may increase the rent seeking activities in
host countries, which eventually reduce productive entrepreneurship and
lower total income of host countries. Moreover, countries with larger
resource suffer more from this negative impact..
5. Nobuaki Hori, Rank Order of Universities and Educational Investment, 『現代経済学研究』特集号 , 2009.06.
Presentations
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1. Political Economy of Moral, Religion, and Liberalism.
2. Excessive Competition and the Mobility of Labor Market .
3. The Rank Order of Universities and Educational Investment .
Membership in Academic Society
  • Japanese Economic Assiciation
  • Japan Association for Applied Economics
  • Japan Law and Economics Association
Educational
Educational Activities
Graduate school: Economic Theory I, Economic Theory II, Industrial Organization, Microeconomics(QBS)
Undergraduate school: Introductory economics, Microeconomics, Applied Microeconomics, Advanced Economic Theory
Other Educational Activities
  • 2008.10.
  • 2006.10.


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