九州大学 研究者情報
総説一覧
FENWICK MARK(フェニック マーク) データ更新日:2022.06.29

教授 /  法学研究院 国際関係法学部門 法学部


総説, 論評, 解説, 書評, 報告書等
1. Mark Fenwick & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Covergence and Diversity in the Hedge Fund and Private Equity Industry, The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds, 2021.09.
2. Mark Fenwick, Marcelo Corrales Compagnucci, Helena Haapio, Timo Minssen, Erik P M Vermeulen, Technology-Driven Disruption of Healthcare & "UI Layer" Privacy-by-Design, AI in Healthcare, Cambridge University Press, 2020.06.
3. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Building the Sustainable Financial Service 'Ecosystems' of Tomorrow, (Chinese University of Hong Kong Machine Lawyering Blog), 2019.10.
4. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Banking and Regulatory Responses to FinTech Revisited: Building the Sustainable Financial Service “Ecosystems” of Tomorrow, (Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper), 2019.08.
5. Mark Fenwick, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, J.A. Mcharey, The End of Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation, 2019.03, [URL].
6. Mark Fenwick, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, A Sustainable Platform Economy & the Future of Corporate Governance, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 441/2019, 10.2139/ssrn.3331508, 2019.02.
7. Mark Fenwick, Wulf Kaal, Erik P M Vermeulen, Why Blockchain Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations: What Can be Learned from the “Digital Transformation”, Journal of the British Blockchain Association, 10.31585/jbba-1-2-(9)2018, 2018.12, [URL].
8. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Board Evaluation, (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation), 2018.11, [URL].
9. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Evaluating the Board of Directors: International Practice, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2018-6, 10.2139/ssrn.3253929, 2018.10, [URL].
10. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain, Crypto, and Artificial Intelligence, European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper,, 2018.10.
11. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Wulf Kaal, How Blockchain will Disrupt Corporate Organizations, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation, 2018.09, [URL].
12. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Joseph A. McCahery, The End of “Corporate” Governance, Chinese University of Hong Kong Machine Lawyering Blog, 2018.09, [URL].
13. Mark Fenwick, Wulf Kaal, Erik P M Vermeulen, Legal Education in a Digital Age: Why "Coding for Lawyers" Matters, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper Series, 2018.08, [URL].
14. Mark Fenwick, Wulf Kaal, Erik P M Vermeulen, Why "Blockchain" Will Disrupt Corporate Organizations?, European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper Series, 2018.08, [URL].
15. Mark Fenwick, J. A. McCahery, Erik P M Vermeulen, The End of “Corporate” Governance (Hello “Platform” Governance), Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper, 2018.08, [URL].
16. Mark Fenwick, E.P. M. Vermeulen, Institutional investor engagement, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Financial Regulation, 2018.02, [URL].
17. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Institutional investor engagement: How to create a “stewardship culture, Tilburg University Law & Economics Center (TILEC) Law & Economics Discussion Paper Series, No. 2018-06, 10.2139/ssrn.3098235, 2018.03, [URL].
18. Mark Fenwick, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Ivona Skultetyova, Capital markets union: Why 'venture capital' is not the answer to Europe's Innovation Challenge, Tilburg University Law & Economics Center (TILEC) Law & Economics Discussion Paper Series, 2018-10, 2018.01.
19. Mark Fenwick, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, De technologische revolutie en de toekomst van het recht, Ontwikkelingen, 2017.11.
20. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, J. A. McCahery, Fintech and the Financing of Entrepreneurs, European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper, No. 369, 2017.08, [URL].
21. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, How the Sharing Economy Is Transforming 'Corporate Governance', Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2017-2, 2017.05, [URL].
22. Mark Fenwick, W. Kaal, E. P. M. Vermeulen, The “new” corporate governance of today’s winning companies, Columbia Law School’s Blog on Corporations & the Capital Markets, 2017.04, [URL].
23. Mark Fenwick, Wulf Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The “unmediated” and “tech-driven” corporate governance of today’s winning companies, University of St Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-10, 2017.02, [URL].
24. Mark Fenwick, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership After the Panama Papers, Report for the World Bank, Report for the World Bank, 2016.09, [URL], The publication of the so-called “Panama Papers” has focused public interest on how elaborate corporate structures and offshore tax havens can be used by politicians, celebrities and other elites to conceal their beneficial ownership of companies and obscure their personal assets. Rather than taking the Panama Papers as an indication of the need for more and stricter disclosure and reporting rules, however, this report advocates an alternative approach. We need to start by acknowledging that many companies are currently experiencing “disclosure and reporting fatigue”, in which the constant demand for “more” and “better” transparency and reporting is having the unintended effect of promoting indifference or evasiveness. Disclosure and reporting is widely perceived as an obligation to be fulfilled and not as an opportunity to add value to a firm. This is confirmed by the findings of an empirical study that examines how disclosure rules operate in practice across various jurisdictions. The key takeaway of this empirical study is that – even in those jurisdictions that have a robust disclosure regime – the majority of firms engage in “grudging” or “boilerplate” compliance in which ownership and control structures are not adequately revealed in an accessible way and – perhaps more importantly – the impact of these ownership and control structures on the governance of a company are obscured.Rather than focus on introducing more stringent and mandatory disclosure rules, the report advocates an approach based on the current communication strategy of a minority of firms in our sample. Interestingly, a small number of firms engage in what we characterize as “open communication” in which information on control structures and its effect on governance are presented in a direct, accessible and highly personalized manner. Such firms seem to recognize the commercial and other strategic benefits to be gained from open communication, and the paper explores the implications of such an approach for both business and regulators..
25. Mark Fenwick, E. P. M. Vermeulen, Disclosure of beneficial ownership after the Panama Papers, Oxford University Business Law Blog, 2016.06, [URL].
26. Mark Fenwick, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Opening the "Black Box" of Europe's Startup Ecosystem (Report for EU Invest Horizon Project), EU Invest Horizon, http://investhorizon.eu/resources_detail.aspx?invest_horizon_resources_id=10, 2016.11.
27. Mark Fenwick, Class Reproduction of Non-Conformity: A Review of Robert Yoder, Asian Journal of Criminology, Volume 2, 10.1007/s11417-006-9019-3, 2007.07.
28. Mark Fenwick, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The Car Company of the Future, Oxford University Business Law Blog, 2016.09, [URL].
29. Mark Fenwick, Review essay on ‘On Governance and Governing’ by Poul Kjaer, EUIJ-Kyushu Review, (Issue 1, p. 163-8), 2011.07.
30. Mark Fenwick, Review essay on ‘European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability’ by J. Gobert & A. Pascal, EUIJ-Kyushu Review, (Issue 1, p. 179-83), 2013.07.
31. Mark Fenwick, Erik P M Vermeulen, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership After the Panama Papers, (Oxford University Business Law Blog), 2016.06.

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