|Chisako T. MASUO||Last modified date：2021.06.30|
Associate Professor / Department of Social Studies / Faculty of Social and Cultural Studies
|1.||Chisako T. Masuo, Paul Midford, Xin Wang, Can China Cooperate?: The Prospects of Fishery Governance in the East Asian Water, International Studies Association Annual Convention 2021, 1-25, 2021.04.|
|2.||The International Impacts of Chinese Fishery Reforms.|
|4.||Chisako T. Masuo, Japan’s Global Diplomacy to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Chap 7), Alexander Lukin ed., The “Roads” and “Belts” of Eurasia, Palgrave Macmillan, 169-191, [ISBN: 978-981-15-0855-4], 2020.03.|
|5.||Chisako T. Masuo, Competitive Cooperation for Regional Development: Japan's New Strategy towards Rising China, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 10.1111/ajph.12585, 65, 3, 430-448, 2019.09.|
|6.||Is Xi Jinping "agressive"?: One perspective on Japan's future.|
|7.||Nobuhiro Aizawa, Nick Bisley, Chisako T. Masuo, Rebecca Strating, Cooperation in Contested Asia: How Japan and Australia Can Shape the Region’s Changing Security Dynamic, The La Trobe Asia Brief, 1, 1-12, 2018.09.|
|8.||Perspectives on China in its surrounding countries: In search for the future Asian international order.|
|9.||Chisako T. Masuo, Toward Exclusive Enforcement?: China’s Fisheries Policy and the Prospects of Maritime Governance in Southeast Asia, International Studies Association Annual Convention 2018, 2018.04.|
|10.||A study on the developmental course of Chinese ‘Diaoyu Dao’ claim: Government propaganda and upsurge of nationalism, [URL].|
|12.||Development of Chinese Maritime Administration and Its Implications on the South China Sea Issue.|
|14.||Chisako T. Masuo, Russia’s Weight for China in the Global Context: Is the China-Russia Partnership Long-lasting?, SRC Summer Symposium: Northeast Asia's Faultline: One Hundred Years of Sino/Russian/Soviet Competitive Cooperation, 2017.07.|
|16.||Chisako T. Masuo, Undesired Contestation: Changes in Japanese Diplomatic Options over the East China Sea Issues with China, International Studies Association Annual Convention 2016, 2016.03.|
|17.||益尾 知佐子, Extending Domestic Governance Over the Seas: China’s Reinforcement of the State Oceanic Administration, Project 2049 Occasional Paper, 2015.08, [URL].|
|18.||Review Articles : China and International Relations Theory : New Discussions Opened by a Rising Power.|
|19.||Chisako T. Masuo, Competing to Cooperate: Roles of Regional Governments in Chinese Approach to Regionalism, International Studies Association Annual Convention 2013, 2013.04.|
|20.||Chisako T. Masuo, Governing a Troubled Relationship: Can the Field of Fisheries Breed Sino-Japanese Cooperation?, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 10.1017/S1468109912000345, 14, 1, 51-71, 2013.03.|
|22.||Chisako T. Masuo, Diversification of Decision-makings in Chinese Foreign Policy, 国立台湾師範大学東亜学系『東亜区域発展国際学術研討会 会議手冊曁論文集』, 18-24, 2011.12.|
|24.||Chisako T. Masuo, East Asia Security Situation, The 9th Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation, 2011.03.|
|25.||Nanning jumps into the world: the role of Guangxi government in China's developing regionalism
Over the last decade, Chinese central government has treated its relations with ASEAN as the cornerstone to advance East Asian regionalism. This paper examines the process of Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, has won the central position domestically in strengthening economic ties with ASEAN countries. In the same time, it points out that Guangxi, under the domestic politics structure, has played accelerating role to step up China's regionalism. After the central government in Beijing decided to conclude China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), Guangxi government not only accepted it soon, but also showed welcoming postures by proposing to host China-ASEAN EXPO in Nanning, boosting up the idea of Pan-Beibu Gulf Economic Area, and so on. In this way, Guangxi was able to launch its own economic development while it was drawing attention of the central government..
|26.||Japan in Chinese "Open-door Policy" : Implications of Tokyo's Economic Success for Domestic Politics in Beijing, 1978
This article analyzed the role Japan had played in Chinese domestic politics in 1978. While staying in Tokyo in spring, Lin Hujia's economic mission carried research not only on Japanese experience for development, but also on export processing zones in South Korea and Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping was irritated to know about the reality of Asian economic success and accelerated his development plans. Deng Liqun, who returned from Tokyo along with other members of Yuan Baohua's economic mission in fall, proposed a new image of Japan as an effective development model for China to follow. This image was spread to the whole nation in order to boot up Deng Xiaoping's "open-door policy." In addition, this paper described how Chinese plant-importing plans were expanded so much in summer during the course of State Council's Theory Conference (guowuyuan wuxuhui) under Deng Xiaoping's new leadership..
|27.||Deng Xiaoping's view toward Japan in transition: from late 1970s to early 1980s.|
|28.||Chisako T. Masuo, Sino-Japanese Relations at the Early Stage of Chinese Opening Period: “Friendship” after “People’s Diplomacy”, 華東師範大学中日関係研究中心『全球視野中的近現代中日関係研究国際学術研討会 会議手冊』, 160-172, 2008.12.|
|30.||Chinese rethinking of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy: moving toward the 'Independent foreign policy', 1979-1981.|
|32.||The Role of Foreign Policy in Deng Xiaoping's Opening-up Strategy: 1978 - the Road to the Sino-Vietnamese War
This article aims to re-examine the political process that allowed Deng Xiaoping to regain his power as Chinese leader in 1978, by focusing his foreign policy on domestic politics. Theoretical relations between his modernization strategy, foreign policy and the international state of affairs will be analyzed. It will be shown how Deng increased the tension with Soviet and Vietnamese "hegemons" while strengthening relations with Western capitalists and South-Eastern Asiancountries. His actions led him to become bogged down in the Sino-Vietnamese War in February1979. In doing so, the earliest foreign policy of Deng, who later became a leading advocate of the "independent foreign policy" as China opened up, will be clearly demonstrated.
In foreign policy terms, Deng was an orthodox successor to Mao Zedong and highlighted opposition to Soviet "hegemonism." However, Deng's greatest domestic political vulnerability arose from his personal history. Deng had been criticized by Mao for his ambitious domestic policy which contradicted Mao's revolutionary zeal. The United States presidential advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski visited China in May 1978 and stressed the importance of Sino-US strategic cooperation. Brzezinski offered China several technical measures to facilitate such relations.After their meeting, Deng started to promote his new opening-up strategy: because Mao's diplomacy to form a coalition with the world against the Soviets had been successful, and also because the Soviet Union was actually perceived as the biggest threat to the world, the US and its allies were willing to help China to become strong enough to deter the powerful Soviet Union.Although the world situation was at a difficult stage, a precious opportunity for China to rapidly develop its economy had arrived with help from the developed countries.
After winning many diplomatic successes with those nations, Deng justified his hurried development strategy by utilizing Mao's foreign policy within the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). He proposed that the party should transfer its focus from class struggle to economic development, and gradually consolidated his domestic power. In parallel, China increasingly exaggerated the Soviet threat and its" surrogate" Vietnamese threat. As the situation in Indochina worsened, Deng made his final decision to launch a war against Vietnam immediately after he took over the leadership of the CCP in late November 1978.
In addition to referring to newspaper articles and information in previous studies, this subject uses a volume of historical documents and memoirs published in China in recent years, as wellas diplomatic records relating to China from other countries..
|36.||Chisako T. Masuo, China’s Policy toward Japan: Stagnation for the Next Level, JIIA Research Report 2003: External Strategy of the New Chinese Leadership, 62-69, 2004.03.|
|40.||China's Relations with the Korean Peninsula in the Deng Xiaoping Period:The "Westphalianization" of Chinese Diplomacy
The 1st Best Thesis Award given by the Japan Association of Asian Studies.