| 東藤 大樹（とうどう たいき） | データ更新日：2023.11.27 |
准教授 ／
システム情報科学研究院
情報学部門
知能科学
| 1. | 東藤大樹, マルチエージェントシステムとゲーム理論，そしてこれから, JSAI-22 企画セッション『マルチエージェントとは何か？』, 2022.06. |
| 2. | Taiki Todo, Strategic Voting and Single-Peaked Preferences, Summer School on Game Theory and Social Choice 2021, 2021.06. |
| 3. | Taiki Todo, Housing Markets over Social Networks, Dagstuhl Seminar 21241: Coalition Formation Games, 2021.06. |
| 4. | Taiki Todo, Social Choice with Variable Populations, The 23rd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA-2020), 2020.11, Social choice theory is one of the well-studied mathematical foundations of decision making for multi-agent systems. In the literature of social choice theory, the number of agents in the system is usually assumed to be a constant, and different social choice functions can be applied to different populations. When the number of agents is treated as a variable, e.g., not observable a priori, however, a social choice function must be carefully designed so that it can accept any possible population as input. Indeed, for the open, anonymous, and dynamic environments, the number of agents is not likely observable for the decision maker. In this talk, I will review some traditional models of social choice, introduce possible extensions of them for variable populations, and discuss the relation with mechanism design.. |
| 5. | Taiki Todo, Market Design with Uncertainty, the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-PRICAI-2020), 2021.01, My research is summarized as mechanism design with uncertainty. Traditional mechanism design focuses on static environments where all the (possibly probabilistic) information about the agents are observable by the mechanism designer. In practice, however, it is possible that the set of participating agents and/or some of their actions are not observable a priori. We therefore focused on various kinds of uncertainty in mechanism design and developed/analyzed several market mechanisms that incentivise agents to behave in a sincere way.. |
| 6. | 東藤大樹, 投票ルール設計のためのアルゴリズム的ゲーム理論, 情報科学技術フォーラム2020（FIT2020）, 2020.09, ミクロ経済学における投票とは、複数の候補者の集合から、投票者の投票をもとに唯一の当選者を選ぶ、社会選択の伝統的な数理モデルの１つである。近年では、本セッションのテーマでもある計算論的社会選択理論や、アルゴリズム的ゲーム理論 (algorithmic game theory) と呼ばれる、情報学と経済学との境界領域の発展に伴い、一般的な投票ルールの設計のほか、より制限された施設配置と呼ばれるモデルのための投票ルール（施設配置ルール）の設計が注目を集めている。本講演の目的は、投票と施設配置に関して、基礎的な知識を提供するとともに、特に情報学分野における最新の研究動向を紹介することである。まず、ギバード・サタースウェイトの定理や中位投票者ルールといった、経済学分野において得られてきた有名な研究成果を説明する。その後、施設配置ルールのアルゴリズム的ゲーム理論に基づく分析や、計算機を用いた投票ルールの自動設計に関する最新の研究動向を、講演者の研究成果と最近の興味を交えつつ紹介する。. |
| 7. | 東藤大樹, 交換のマーケットデザイン, 群体数理技術検討会, 2018.11. |
| 8. | 東藤大樹, マーケットデザインとゲーム理論, 創発システムシンポジウム2018, 2018.09, [URL]. |
| 9. | Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Strategy-proof cake cutting mechanisms for all-or-nothing utility, 18th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2015, 2015.01, [URL], The cake cutting problem must fairly allocate a divisible good among agents who have varying preferences over it. Recently, designing strategy-proof cake cutting mechanisms has caught considerable attention from AI and MAS researchers. Previous works assumed that an agent’s utility function is additive so that theoretical analysis becomes tractable. However, in practice, agents have non-additive utility functions over a resource. In this paper, we consider the allor-nothing utility function as a representative example of non-additive utility because it can widely cover agents’ preferences for real-world resources, such as the usage of meeting rooms, time slots for computational resources, bandwidth usage, and so on. We first show the incompatibility between envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency when each agent has all-or-nothing utility. We next propose two strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy Pareto efficiency, which are based on a serial dictatorship mechanism, at the sacrifice of envy-freeness. To address computational feasibility, we propose an approximation algorithm to find a near-optimal allocation in time polynomial in the number of agents, since the problem of finding a Pareto efficient allocation is NP-hard. As another approach that abandon Pareto efficiency, we develop an envy-free mechanism and show that one of our serial dictatorship based mechanisms satisfies proportionality in expectation, which is a weaker definition of proportionality. Finally, we evaluate the efficiency obtained by our proposed mechanisms by computational experiments.. |
| 10. | Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Exchange of indivisible objects with asymmetry, 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2015, 2015.01, In this paper we study the exchange of indivisible objects where agents' possible preferences over the objects are strict and share a common structure among all of them, which represents a certain level of asymmetry among objects. A typical example of such an exchange model is a re-scheduling of tasks over several processors, since all task owners are naturally assumed to prefer that their tasks are assigned to fast processors rather than slow ones. We focus on designing exchange rules (a.k.a. mechanisms) that simultaneously satisfy strategyproofness, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency. We first provide a general impossibility result for agents' preferences that are determined in an additive manner, and then show an existence of such an exchange rule for further restricted lexicographic preferences. We finally find that for the restricted case, a previously known equivalence between the single-valuedness of the strict core and the existence of such an exchange rule does not carry over.. |
| 11. | Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences, 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015, 2015.06, Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are not allowed. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under the ATTC procedure is NP-hard. Under the ATTC procedure, we finally clarify the relationship between preference misreport and splitting, which is a different type of manipulation.. |
| 12. | Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Saya Onoue, Kenichi Matsumoto, Characteristics of sustainable OSS projects A theoretical and empirical study, 8th International Workshop on Cooperative and Human Aspects of Software Engineering, CHASE 2015, 2015.07, [URL], How can we attract developers? What can we do to incentivize developers to write code? We started the study by introducing the population pyramid visualization to software development communities, called software population pyramids, and found a typical pattern in shapes. This pattern comes from the differences in attracting coding contributors and discussion contributors. To understand the causes of the differences, we then build game-theoretical models of the contribution situation. Based on these results, we again analyzed the projects empirically to support the outcome of the models, and found empirical evidence. The answers to the initial questions are clear. To incentivize developers to code, the projects should prepare documents, or the projects or third parties should hire developers, and these are what sustainable projects in Git Hub did in reality. In addition, making innovations to reduce the writing costs can also have an impact in attracting coding contributors.. |
| 13. | Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, False-name-proof locations of two facilities Economic and algorithmic approaches, 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016, 2016.02, This paper considers a mechanism design problem for locating two identical facilities on an interval, in which an agent can pretend to be multiple agents. A mechanism selects a pair of locations on the interval according to the declared singlepeaked preferences of agents. An agent's utility is determined by the location of the better one (typically the closer to her ideal point). This model can represent various application domains. For example, assume a company is going to release two models of its product line and performs a questionnaire survey in an online forum to determine their detailed specs. Typically, a customer will buy only one model, but she can answer multiple times by logging onto the forum under several email accounts. We first characterize possible outcomes of mechanisms that satisfy false-name-proofness, as well as some mild conditions. By extending the result, we completely characterize the class of false-name-proof mechanisms when locating two facilities on a circle.We then clarify the approximation ratios of the false-name-proof mechanisms on a line metric for the social and maximum costs. 1 Introduction.. |
| 14. | Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets, 19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016, 2016.01, [URL], We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.. |
| 15. | Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences, 20th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2017, 2017.01, [URL], We consider the problem of locating facilities on a discrete acyclic graph, where agents’ locations are publicly known and the agents are requested to report their demands, i.e., which facilities they want to access. In this paper, we study the effect of manipulations by agents that utilize vacant vertices. Such manipulations are called rename or false-name manipulations in game theory and mechanism design literature. For locating one facility on a path, we carefully compare our model with traditional ones and clarify their differences by pointing out that some existing results in the traditional model do not carry over to our model. For locating two facilities, we analyze the existing and new mechanisms from a perspective of approximation ratio and provide non-trivial lower bounds. Finally, we introduce a new mechanism design model where richer information is available to the mechanism designer and show that under the new model false-name-proofness does not always imply population monotonicity.. |
| 16. | Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Service exchange problem, 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018, 2018.01, In this paper, we study the service exchange problem where each agent is willing to provide her service in order to receive in exchange the service of someone else. We assume that agent's preference depends both on the service that she receives and the person who receives her service. This framework is an extension of the housing market problem to preferences including a degree of externalities. We investigate the complexity of computing an individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation of services to agents for ordinal preferences, and the complexity of computing an allocation which maximizes either the utility sum or the utility of the least served agent for cardinal preferences.. |
| 17. | Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Facility location with variable and dynamic populations, 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018, 2018.01, Facility location is a well-studied problem in social choice literature. where agents' preferences are restricted to be single-peaked. When the number of agents is treated as a variable (e.g., not observable a priori), a social choice function must be defined so that it can accept any possible number of preferences as input. Furthermore, there exist cases where multiple choices must be made continuously while agents dynamically arrive/leave. Under such variable and dynamic populations, a social choice function needs to give each agent an incentive to sincerely report her existence. In this paper we investigate facility location models with variable and dynamic populations. For a static, i.e., one-shot, variable population model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a social choice function to satisfy participation, as well as truthfulness, anonymity, and Pareto efficiency. The condition is given as a further restriction on the well-known median voter schemes. For a dynamic model, we first propose an online social choice function, which is optimal for the total sum of the distances between the choices in the previous and current periods, among any Pareto efficient functions. We then define a generalized class of online social choice functions and compare their performances both theoretically and experimentally.. |
| 18. | Ken C.K. Fong, Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Facility location games with fractional preferences, 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018, 2018.01, In this paper, we propose a fractional preference model for the facility location game with two facilities that serve the similar purpose on a line where each agent has his location information as well as fractional preference to indicate how well they prefer the facilities. The preference for each facility is in the range of [0, L] such that the sum of the preference for all facilities is equal to 1. The utility is measured by subtracting the sum of the cost of both facilities from the total length L where the cost of facilities is defined as the multiplication of the fractional preference and the distance between the agent and the facilities. We first show that the lower bound for the objective of mini-1 mizing total cost is at least Ω(n3). Hence, we use the utility function to analyze the agents' satification. Our objective is to place two facilities on [0, L] to maximize the social utility or the minimum utility. For each objective function, we propose deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms. For the objective of maximizing the social utility, we present an optimal deterministic strategy-proof mechanism in the case where agents can only misreport their locations. In the case where agents can only misreport their preferences, we present a 2-approximation deterministic strategy-proof mechanism. Finally, we present a 4-approximation deterministic strategyproof mechanism and a randomized strategy-proof mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2 where agents can misreport both the preference and location information. Moreover, we also give a lower-bound of 1.06. For the objective of maximizing the minimum utility, we give a lower-bound of 1.5 and present a 2-approximation deterministic strategyproof mechanism where agents can misreport both the preference and location.. |
| 19. | Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Manipulations in Two-Agent Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences, Fifteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-16), 2016.05. |
| 20. | Taiki Todo, Fairness and False-Name-Proofness in Randomized Allocation of a Divisible Good, Dagstuhl Seminar 16232: Fair Division, 2016.06. |
| 21. | Taiki Todo, Establishing a Theory for Exchange of Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences, Microsoft Research Japan-Korea Academic Day 2016, 2016.05. |
| 22. | 小野 友寛, 富永 優仁, 苑田 尭久, 東藤 大樹, 横尾 真, 異なる性質を有する二施設配置のための架空名義操作不可能なメカニズム, 第30回人工知能学会全国大会 , 2016.06. |
| 23. | Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences, 日本ソフトウェア科学会 第31回大会, 2014.09. |
| 24. | Taiki Todo, Establishing a Theory for Exchange of Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences, Microsoft Research Korea-Japan Academic Day 2015, 2015.05. |
| 25. | 孫 兆鴻, 東藤 大樹, 横尾 真, 物々交換モデルにおける財の非対称性, 第29回人工知能学会全国大会, 2015.05. |
| 26. | 富永 優仁, 苑田 尭久, 東藤 大樹, 横尾 真, 2人ラウンド制 Item Picking Game の解析, 第29回人工知能学会全国大会, 2015.05. |
| 27. | 伊原 尚正, 鶴田 俊佑, 東藤 大樹, 櫻井 祐子, 横尾 真, 戦略的操作不可能なケーキ分割メカニズムの提案, 第29回人工知能学会全国大会, 2015.05. |
| 28. | Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Exchange of Indivisible Objects with Asymmetry, Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-15), 2015.07. |
| 29. | Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Saya Onoue, Ken-ichi Matsumoto, Characteristics of Sustainable OSS Projects: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, Eighth International Workshop on Cooperative and Human Aspects of Software Engineering (CHASE-15), 2015.05. |
| 30. | Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting, Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15), 2015.05. |
| 31. | Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach, Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15), 2015.05. |
| 32. | Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Hidenao Iwane, Hirokazu Anai, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo, Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination, Fourteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-15), 2015.05. |
| 33. | Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences, Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15), 2015.01. |
| 34. | 鶴田 俊佑, 岡 雅晃, 東藤 大樹, 櫻井 祐子, 横尾 真, ケーキ分割問題における架空名義操作, 合同エージェントワークショップ＆シンポジウム2014 (JAWS-2014), 2014.10. |
| 35. | 苑田 尭久, 東藤 大樹, 横尾 真, 架空名義操作不可能な二施設配置メカニズム, 合同エージェントワークショップ＆シンポジウム2014 (JAWS-2014), 2014.10. |
| 36. | 藤田 悦誌, 東藤 大樹, 横尾 真, 最小費用全域木ゲームにおける名義分割に対する一考察, 合同エージェントワークショップ＆シンポジウム2014 (JAWS-2014) , 2014.10. |
| 37. | Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Predicting Own Action: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Induced by Proper Scoring Rules, The Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP-14), 2014.11. |
| 38. | Dengji Zhao, Siqi Luo, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-Minded Decomposition, The Twenty-First European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014), 2014.08. |
| 39. | Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences, The Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2014), 2014.07, [URL]. |
| 40. | Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, Makoto Yokoo, Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments, The Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2014), 2014.07. |
| 41. | 苑田 尭久, 東藤 大樹, 横尾 真, 効率性と誘因制約を両立可能な物々交換モデルの特徴付け, 第28回人工知能学会全国大会 (JSAI 2014), 2014.05, [URL]. |
| 42. | 鶴田 俊佑, 岡 雅晃, 東藤 大樹, 櫻井 祐子, 横尾 真, 架空名義操作不可能な再配分メカニズムの特徴付け, 第28回人工知能学会全国大会 (JSAI 2014), 2014.05, [URL]. |
| 43. | 不動 顕, 岡 雅晃, 東藤 大樹, 櫻井 祐子, 横尾 真, 効率的な資源利用のための利用予測申告と実行動に関する一考察, 第28回人工知能学会全国大会 (JSAI 2014), 2014.05, [URL]. |
| 44. | Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Coexistence of Utilitarian Efficiency and False-name-proofness in Social Choice, The Thirteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2014), 2014.05, [URL]. |
| 45. | Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Optimal False-name-proof Single-Item Redistribution Mechanisms, The Thirteenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2014), 2014.05, [URL]. |
| 46. | Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo, Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences: Beyond Sönmez's Result, The 16th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC) and Trading Agents Design and Analysis (TADA), 2014.05, [URL]. |
| 47. | Taiki Todo, A complexity approach for Pareto efficient exchange with multiple indivisible goods, Warsaw Workshop on Economic and Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Social Choice, 2014.03, [URL]. |
| 48. | Taiki Todo, Strategy-proof exchange with multiple private endowments, The First International Workshop on Market Design Technologies for Sustainable Development, 2013.11, [URL]. |
| 49. | 藤田 悦誌, 岩﨑 敦, 東藤 大樹, ヨウ ミョウ, 横尾 真, VCG-equivalent in Expectation メカニズム, 第27回人工知能学会全国大会 (JSAI 2013), 2013.06, [URL]. |
| 50. | Taiki Todo, Vincent Conitzer, False-name-proof Matching, The Twelfth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), 2013.05, [URL]. |
| 51. | Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Miao Yao, Makoto Yokoo, VCG-equivalent Mechanism in Expectation: General Framework for Constructing Iterative Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms, The Twelfth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), 2013.05, [URL]. |
| 52. | Taiki Todo, False-name-proofness in Online Mechanisms, Duke University Visiting Day, 2013.02. |
| 53. | Taiki Todo, False-name-proof Matching, Duke CS-ECON Seminar, 2013.02, [URL]. |
| 54. | 東藤 大樹, Mechanism Design in Highly Anonymous Environments, The 21st Gathering of JSPS Japanese Fellows, 2012.10. |
| 55. | Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, False-name-proofness in Online Mechanisms, The Eleventh International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), 2012.06, [URL]. |
| 56. | Taiki Todo, Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents, The 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2012), 2012.06, [URL]. |
| 57. | Takayuki Mouri, Runcong Li, Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Envy-Freeness for Groups of Agents: Beyond Single-Minded Domain, Joint Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis (TADA) and Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC), 2012.06, [URL]. |
| 58. | Taiki Todo, False-name-proof Mechanism Design without Money, Duke CS-ECON Seminar, 2012.04, [URL]. |
| 59. | 東藤 大樹, 岩﨑 敦, 横尾 真, 無閉路ネットワーク上の架空名義操作不可能な施設配置メカニズムの特徴付け, 日本OR学会 2011年秋季研究発表会, 2011.09, [URL]. |
| 60. | 毛利 貴之, 杉町 勇和, 東藤 大樹, 岩﨑 敦, 横尾 真, 自動メカニズムデザインを利用した組合せオークションのルール抽出アルゴリズムの提案, 第10回情報科学技術フォーラム (FIT 2011), 2011.09, [URL]. |
| 61. | 東藤 大樹, Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory (SWET 2011), 2011.08, [URL]. |
| 62. | Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents, The Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011), 2011.07, [URL]. |
| 63. | 毛利 貴之, 杉町 勇和, 東藤 大樹, 岩﨑 敦, 横尾 真, 自動メカニズムデザインのデータからのルール抽出, 第25回人工知能学会全国大会 (JSAI 2011), 2011.06, [URL]. |
| 64. | 東藤 大樹, 李 潤樅, 胡 雪梅, 毛利 貴之, 岩﨑 敦, 横尾 真, 組合せオークションにおける無羨望性の拡張, 第25回人工知能学会全国大会, 2011.06, [URL]. |
| 65. | Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, False-name-proof Mechanism Design without Money, The Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), 2011.05, [URL]. |
| 66. | Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, False-name-proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line, The Sixth Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2010), 2010.12, [URL]. |
| 67. | Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, False-name-proofness in Online Mechanisms, The First International Joint Agent Workshop & Symposium (iJAWS 2010), 2010.10, [URL]. |
| 68. | Taiki Todo, False-name-proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line, Hitotsubashi G-COE Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare, 2010.10, [URL]. |
| 69. | 東藤 大樹, 岩﨑 敦, 横尾 真, 架空名義操作不可能な施設配置メカニズムの特徴付け., 第9回情報科学技術フォーラム (FIT 2010), 2010.09, [URL]. |
| 70. | 毛利 貴之, 東藤 大樹, 岩﨑 敦, 横尾 真, 架空名義操作不可能な組合せオークションメカニズム：VCG メカニズムの改良, 第9回情報科学技術フォーラム (FIT 2010), 2010.09, [URL]. |
| 71. | Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions, 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology (IAT 2010), 2010.09, [URL]. |
| 72. | Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Taiki Todo, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms, The Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010.05, [URL]. |
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